In the part two of the research on Null Session and MS-RPC interfaces, the author delves into the difficulty of preventing and monitoring domain information enumeration without authentication.
Despite attempts to block such activities using group policies like 'Restrict Unauthenticated RPC Clients', issues arise, such as domain controller functionalities being severely disrupted.
The article discusses the impact of setting the group policy to 'Authenticated without exceptions' on remote WMI access and broader domain functionality.
The research explores MS-RPC security and methods to secure RPC servers, focusing on interfaces like MS-NRPC, using theoretical insight and reverse engineering for deeper understanding.
Various challenges in detecting and monitoring RPC activity without authentication are highlighted, with insights on using Event Tracing for Windows and third-party tools like RPC-Firewall.
Detailed explanations are provided on registration flags, securing endpoints and interfaces, and binding authentication for RPC servers.
The article concludes with in-depth analyses using automated tools and reverse engineering, revealing how the MS-NRPC interface security mechanism enables bypassing security checks and accessing functions without authentication.
Insights into security callbacks, security descriptors, and the intricacies of RPC security add depth to the exploration, shedding light on the author's investigative approaches.
The comprehensive research aims to empower readers with an understanding of the complexities surrounding no-authentication enumeration and offers insights for detection and mitigation.
Through detailed analysis and reverse engineering, the article provides a holistic view of the security mechanisms behind the MS-NRPC interface and how bypassing security checks is facilitated.