<ul><li>Researchers from University of Rennes-INSA Rennes-IETR-UMR and Université Bretagne Sud/Lab-STICC- UMR CNRS have published a technical paper on a new Clock-to-Clock Modulation Covert Channel attack on Spread Spectrum modulated clocks.</li><li>The paper discusses how the attack leverages the unintended coupling between Spread Spectrum Clocks (SSCs) and nearby clocks, termed Clock-to-Clock Modulation (CCM), to establish an air-gap covert channel.</li><li>Unlike previous methods that target non-clock components, CCM allows for basic on/off operations to manipulate carrier signals, enabling transmission of 3 bits per symbol period at a bit rate of 100 bit/s.</li><li>The research validates the CCM attack through experimental implementation on an air-gapped system, demonstrating the feasibility of manipulating Peripheral Component Interconnect (PCI) clocks for covert communication.</li></ul>

Air-Gap Covert Channel Attack On Spread Spectrum Modulated Clocks (IETR, Lab-STICC)

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