Side-channel attacks analyze unintended information leakage from the physical implementation of a system during normal operation.
Timing attacks are a common side-channel attack that targets how code runs to extract sensitive data by measuring response times.
Researchers demonstrated extracting RSA private keys over a network through timing analysis in 2003, highlighting the real danger of timing attacks for systems.
Authentication systems with timing leaks can reveal sensitive information through response time differences for valid and invalid inputs.
Rate limiting systems can become timing attack vectors, allowing attackers to detect rate limits and adjust attack patterns.
Defending against timing attacks requires constant-time programming, architectural defenses, and monitoring systems to ensure execution time independence from secret data.
Constant-time comparison functions and architectural defenses like decoupling requests/responses are essential in timing attack defense.
Monitoring systems help detect timing attack attempts through analysis of request patterns and response times.
Protecting code against timing attacks involves switching to timing-safe functions, implementing dummy processing for authentication failures, and using libraries with built-in protection.
Combining defensive layers like constant-time implementations, architectural protections, and monitoring is crucial to resist timing attacks across various applications.